

UTAH

AVIAN INFLUENZA SURVEILLANCE AND RESPONSE PLAN

Utah Department of Agriculture and Food

I. JUSTIFICATION

(A) Avian influenza (AI) is a disease of increasing worldwide importance with growing implications as a human disease threat.

(B) The potential for low pathogenic (LP) varieties of AI to mutate to highly pathogenic (HP) strains, affecting domestic poultry, is significant.

(C) Additional driving forces for a national H5/H7 avian influenza control plan consist of:

1. Consideration by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) to re-define avian influenza to include not just highly pathogenic, but all H5/H7 viruses including low pathogenic strains; and

 2. Influence of international markets on the economic viability of our nation's poultry industry. It is in the best interests of government, human health, and the poultry industry to prevent and control all H5/H7 avian influenza virus infections.

(D) H5/H7 avian influenza is a disease reportable to the State Veterinarian's office by all licensed or otherwise legally practicing veterinarians in the State and all laboratories.

(E) Under a nationally-sanctioned plan, USDA-APHIS would be involved at the invitation of the State Veterinarian in the cost and control efforts of an outbreak. This Voluntary Cooperative State–Federal Program to control and eradicate H5/H7 avian influenza infections of commercial poultry is state-based and coordinated. The plan will provide for stakeholder input and participation, establishment of passive and active surveillance programs, and planning for a coordinated, pre-planned response in the event of an AI outbreak in the state. The goal is to provide a level of assurance to poultry producers and trading partners and an adequate level of surveillance and response preparedness for government.

II. AVIAN INFLUENZA ADVISORY COMMITTEE

The formation of a state advisory committee has been requested by industry in order to bring all stakeholders such as Utah Department of Agriculture and Food (UDAF), USDA-APHIS, Utah Department of Health, and various producer groups together to provide plan input. The formation of this committee is the first essential element to development of a state AI response plan. It is agreed that the AI Advisory Committee in Utah will be comprised of the following participants:

- 45 (1) State Veterinarian – Director of Animal Industry or representative 46 (2) USDA-APHIS Area Veterinarian in Charge (AVIC) or representative 47 (3) Utah Department of Health representative 48 (4) Utah Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory representative 49 (5) Utah State University Extension 50 (6) NPIP Contact representative 51 (7) Utah Egg Producer's representative and/or consultant 52 (8) Utah Turkey Marketing Board representative 53 (9) Game bird representative (pheasant, chukar, quail, etc.) 54 (10) Utah Fancy Poultry Association/Pigeon Breeders representative 55 (11) Utah Division of Wildlife Resources representative 56 (12) Department of Environmental Quality representative 57 58 59 III. MONITORING PLAN 60 61 (A) The State will maintain "U. S. H5/H7 Avian Influenza Monitored State" status under 62 the National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP) program for avian influenza (see 63 Appendix #1). In furtherance of that requirement the following surveillance activities will 64 be implemented: 65 66 (B) All commercial producers should sign a *Memorandum of Understanding* (MOU) to 67 support the diagnostic surveillance program by timely submission of appropriate 68 specimens. 69 70 (C) The Extension veterinarian (or appointee) will institute an ongoing avian influenza 71 awareness program for all legally practicing veterinarians and poultry producers in the 72 state. 73 74 (D) It should be further understood that: 75 76 (1) No liability shall accrue to the UDAF for damages, losses, or injuries incidental to or 77 arising by virtue of participation in this plan.
- 78 79
- (2) The flock owner has the responsibility to adopt and implement the biosecurity measures set forth elsewhere in this agreement.

83

(3) The flock owner has the responsibility of maintaining records of flock morbidity, mortality, and production and shall make such records available for review by the UDAF as requested.

848586

(E) Serology

- 88 (1) *Testing*
- 89 (a) Serologic testing will be used as a screening test for monitoring purposes only. 90 Routine screening for type A avian influenza virus in poultry will be performed using

- either agar gel immunodiffusion (AGID) or enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA). The AGID test is to be performed according to the "National Poultry Improvement Plan and Auxiliary Provisions" §147.9¹; ELISA test is performed using only federally licensed kits and following the manufacturer's instructions.
- (b) A premise or flock will be considered suspect positive if serologic testing reveals antigenic exposure to Type A influenza virus.
- (c) A premise or flock will be considered positive only when live influenza virus is isolated or its presence detected by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing.
- (d) Positive test results of any type will be reported immediately to the State Veterinarian, as required by Rule in R58-2-2. In the case of a positive serologic test, the State Veterinarian may issue a *Hold Order* and prescribe certain biosecurity measures to be implemented until virus identification is completed and/or assessment of the clinical symptoms exhibited by the flock is made.
- i) Hold Order is defined as authority of the State Veterinarian to impose movement restrictions and/or testing requirements appropriate to conditions until a definitive diagnosis or quarantine decision is reached. The Hold Order may involve all or any portion of restrictions defined under Quarantine Measures (see section V) as deemed appropriate to the circumstances by the State Veterinarian.

(2) Passive Surveillance

- (a) All laboratories that perform diagnostic procedures on avian species (private, State-Federal Cooperative, public health, and university laboratories) will examine all submitted cases of severe, atypical, or otherwise unexplained respiratory disease, gastrointestinal disease, neurologic disease, egg production drops, and high mortality, for avian influenza by both a USDA-approved serologic test and a USDA-approved influenza virus detection test. Results of such testing will be reported quarterly to the State Veterinarian. Positive tests will be reported immediately.
- (b) A minimum of 60 meat turkey processing plant blood samples per month are to be tested by USDA-approved serologic protocol (i.e., AGID or ELISA) and reported quarterly to the State Veterinarian. Positive tests will be reported immediately. Plant records shall be maintained for 3 years (NPIP §146.11.c).

(3) Active Surveillance

- (a) UDAF in conjunction with USDA, APHIS, VS, Utah Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory (UVDL), and commercial producer organizations will implement a commercial poultry surveillance program.
 - (b) Active surveillance must include serologic sampling of sentinels in the field.
- (i) At least 30 clearly identified unvaccinated birds for AI within a flock are caught and monitored quarterly (90 days) by serologic or other approved tests. Strategically located flocks may serve as sampling units if at least 30 randomly selected members of each unvaccinated flock are monitored quarterly by serologic or other approved tests. This targeted surveillance is to consist of flocks considered at greater risk

Utah Department of Agriculture and Food

¹ At the January 26, 2005 General Conference Committee Meeting it was passed to immediately implement an amendment to the laboratory protocol for the AGID test for avian influenza requiring no more than <u>three</u> unknowns be tested in a seven-well format with the center well containing antigen.

of becoming infected with AI, such as turkeys allowed access to outdoors in areas where wild waterfowl are prone to live.

(ii) Number of sampling units required (i.e., flocks to be monitored) will depend on geographic location and other relevant circumstances, such as proximity to wild waterfowl, cross-traffic potential, etc.².

IV. RESPONSE PLAN

The State Veterinarian and the USDA, APHIS, VS Area Veterinarian in Charge (AVIC) will administer an Initial Containment and Control Plan developed in conjunction with the Advisory Committee. The Commissioner of Agriculture may request the Governor to declare a state of emergency once state resources have been exhausted or are found inadequate. USDA-APHIS-VS will be invited to develop an Incident Command Center to implement the deployment of necessary state and federal resources to respond to the emergency outbreak.

(A) Criteria for declaring a premise suspect-positive for AI

- (1) Epidemiologic link with an AI suspect flock or premise. An epidemiologic link is considered to be established if one or more of the following occur(s):
- (a) Poultry operations employing workers who reside in the same household as person(s) associated with a confirmed AI outbreak elsewhere.
- (b) All farms within the same organization that the AI outbreak occurs particularly if there is sharing of equipment and/or personnel, or if close geographic ties exist.
- (c) Poultry farms, companies, or personnel using common facilities or equipment, such as breaker plant, feed mill, egg flats, trucking company, vaccination crews, or other equipment.

- (2) Flock/bird with no clinical signs, no lesions compatible with AI, and no epidemiologic link but AI-positive by one of the following tests:
 - (a) AGID
 - (b) ELISA³
 - (c) DirectigenTM Flu A

(B) Criteria for declaring a premise positive for HP/LP AI during a confirmed AI outbreak:

(1) Flocks/birds showing clinical signs of respiratory disease, sudden unexplained drop in egg production, or lesions consistent with AI (i.e., edema of the head, comb, or wattles; subcutaneous hemorrhage of feet or shanks; hemorrhage/necrosis of comb, wattles, trachea, heart, and/or gut) should be considered suspicious for AI until confirmed or ruled out by appropriate diagnostic tests.

_

² Additional protocol may be written into the MOU if needed.

³ Because of the possibility of false positives using ELISA, all ELISA-positive sera shall be re-tested using AGID.

- 177 (2) Premises inside surveillance zones are considered positive if birds exhibit clinical 178 signs and/or gross lesions consistent with low or highly pathogenic avian influenza 179 virus plus one of the following laboratory tests. 180
 - (a) Isolation and identification of AIV
 - (b) Positive RT-PCR with H5 or H7 AIV specific primer/probe set
 - (c) Presence of H5 or H7 AIV subtype-specific serum antibodies

185

186 187

188

189

190

191

192

193

194

195

196

197

198

199

181

- (3) Premises inside surveillance zones without clinical signs and/or gross lesions, must meet two of the following conditions to be declared positive.
- (a) Directigen-positive (cannot be only criterion to designate a premise as positive even with an epidemiologic link)
 - (b) Isolation and identification of H5 or H7 subtypes of AIV
 - (c) Positive RT-PCR with H5 or H7 AIV specific primer/probe set
 - (d) Presence of H5 or H7 AIV subtype-specific serum antibodies
- (e) Epidemiologic link. An epidemiologic link is considered to be established if one or more of the following occur(s):
- (i) Poultry operations employing workers who reside in the same household as person(s) associated with a confirmed AI outbreak elsewhere.
- (ii) All farms within the same organization that the AI outbreak occurs particularly if there is sharing of equipment and/or personnel, or if close geographic ties exist.
- (iii) Poultry farms, companies, or personnel using common facilities or equipment, such as breaker plant, feed mill, egg flats, trucking company, vaccination crews, or other equipment.

200 201 202

(C) Initial response plan for an AI-positive flock or premise

203 204 205

206

207

208

209

210

211

212

213

214

215

216

- (1) Positive AI serology (AGID or ELISA) without increased mortality or other clinical signs
- (a) The flock or farm will be placed under Hold Order and strict biosecurity measures will be met.
- (b) All commercial poultry flock owners will be informed of the status of the Hold Order.
- (c) Cloacal and pharyngeal swabs from birds in the infected flock shall be sent to UVDL for testing by RT-PCR.
- (i) If RT-PCR is positive for either H5 or H7, swabs will be immediately forwarded to the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) for subtyping. NVSL will carry out virus isolation for characterization and pathogenicity testing. Initial subtype results should be obtained within 24 to 48 hours. Pathogenicity of the isolate is normally determined within 5 to 20 days.

217 218

219 (2) Positive AI serology accompanied by significant unexplained on-farm mortality or 220 other clinical signs

- (a) The flock or farm will be quarantined and strict biosecurity measures will be met.
- (b) A quarantine zone around the affected premises will be imposed, and other company-owned or other related flocks will be assessed for risk based on levels of biosecurity in place at the time of the outbreak.
- (c) Pooled (up to five birds per tube) pharyngeal and cloacal swabs will be collected according to Table 1 and submitted to UVDL for RT-PCR testing.
- (d) Tissues (lung, spleen, brains, and/or intestines) from individual dead birds will be sent to UVDL. Positive tissues will be forwarded to NVSL for virus isolation, characterization, and pathogenicity testing. All testing and collection of samples will be performed on-site using appropriate biosecurity precautions.

(D) Response following definitive diagnosis of AI (subtype-dependent)

(1) LPAI subtype H5 or H7

- (a) The flock or farm will be quarantined and strict biosecurity measures will be met.
- (b) Following consultation with USDA and industry parties involved, an infected flock may be depopulated. This depopulation may take place as much as two to four weeks after the initial outbreak in order to reduce the amount of virus spread by infected virus-shedding birds. If there is depopulation then costs would be covered by state/federal indemnity arrangements.
- (c) Spent laying hen, turkey breeder, or turkey meat flocks found to be serologically positive to LPAI H5/H7 but without the ability to infect sentinel birds or evidence of virus shedding may be moved to approved slaughter. Sequential depopulation by slaughter may occur once viral testing and sentinel birds indicate the flock to be without active infection for a period of at least three weeks.
 - (i) If birds are going to approved slaughter there will be no indemnity.
- (d) Limited and controlled vaccination of commercial laying hen, turkey breeder, or turkey meat flocks may be used as a method of eradicating the disease, provided that adequate biosecurity is in place with approval of the state veterinarian.
- (i) Cost of vaccination will be covered by the producer(s) implementing the vaccination program.
- (e) Surveillance of all flocks or farms surrounding an infected flock as per section V.A. of this document will be undertaken, and any other company-owned or other epidemiologically related flocks located outside the surveillance zone will also be monitored. Surveillance will be by use of RT-PCR for H5 or H7 AI.
- (i) Cost of testing other company-owned or related flocks will be covered by the producer(s); epidemiologically unrelated surrounding flocks will be tested at state/federal expense.
- (f) Serologic surveillance will continue weekly until the infected flock has been free of active infection for at least 30 days or until all surrounding and epidemiologically linked flocks or farms have been sufficiently tested and found free of active infection for a period of at least 30 days.
- (g) Flock or farm will be tested according to Table 1, taking into consideration special stipulations (if any) contained in the MOU.

Table 1. Number of birds sampled for serology, PCR, and/or virus isolation on each premise.^a

No. birds on premise Minimum number of		f birds to be sampled
15 or less		Sample all 15
50 or greater		30

^aAssuming a 95% or greater sensitivity and 99% specificity for the diagnostic testing system used, sampling the indicated number of birds will result in a 95% certainty that at least one positive bird will be detected if at least a 25% prevalence of HPAI virus shedding exists among birds on the premises at the time of sample collection

(2) Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI)

- (a) The flock or farm will be quarantined and strict biosecurity measures will be met.
- (b) HPAI is an emergency animal disease and therefore infected flock(s) will be depopulated.
- (c) Appraisal of the flock is to occur prior to depopulation as required in Title 4-31-3 of the Utah Code (unannotated).
 - (d) Surveillance will be the same as that used for LPAI H5/H7

(3) LPAI other subtypes

- (a) Strict biosecurity measures will be maintained throughout the life of the flock.
- (b) Control measures to be taken are to be presented in writing by poultry producers to state officials.
- (c) Surveillance shall be carried out in adjacent or epidemiologically linked flocks until the infection has been shown to no longer be active. This testing shall be in the form of serology, virus isolation, RT-PCR and/or sentinel birds.
 - (i) Cost of testing will be covered by the producer(s).
- (ii) The producer should be able to take samples, when under the direction of an accredited veterinarian.

V. QUARANTINE MEASURES

Quarantine authority resides with the State Veterinarian, Commissioner of Agriculture, and the Governor. Quarantines on all movement of poultry within, into, and out of one or more of the designated Containment Regions will be imposed by the State Veterinarian upon confirmation of the isolation of live AI virus and subject to approval of the Commissioner of Agriculture. Quarantines will be enforced by Department of Agriculture and Food personnel and local law enforcement officers.

315 (A) Establishment of surveillance zones

- 317 (1) Three distinct zones, with varying intensities of surveillance will be established:
- - (a) Affected Zone included the area within 5 miles (8 km) of the index flock; (b) Surveillance Zone including the area between 5 and 10 miles (8 and 16 km) of
- 320 the index flock; 321 (c) *Buffe*
 - (c) *Buffer Zone* including the area between 10 and 30 miles (16 and 50 km) of the index flock.

(2) Particular attention to surveillance efforts is to be given to company-owned, other epidemiologically related flocks, common breaker plants, feed mills, vaccination crews, movement of other equipment and personnel, recently purchased breeder stock, or recent participation in exhibition shows or swap meets. These potential epidemiologic links shall be rigorously assessed for risk based on levels of biosecurity in place at the time of the outbreak.

331 (3) Affected Zone

- (a) The Affected Zone includes the area within 5 miles (8 km) of the index flock. The target population to include in surveillance will be all commercial and non-commercial poultry operations.
- (b) Commercial poultry operations (defined as any marketing of poultry or poultry products)
- (i) Commercial poultry operations will continue to conduct active serologic surveillance as required by this document and the existing MOU.
- (ii) Cloacal and tracheal swabs will be collected by or under the supervision of a USDA-accredited veterinarian from poultry in each house, building, or flock located on the operation. Sick and freshly dead birds are targeted for sampling.
- (iii) The total number of birds that will be sampled in each unit is presented in Table 1. Serologic surveillance shall continue weekly for a minimum of 30 days after the last active case of influenza is depopulated, processed, or no longer shedding virus.
- (iv) Swab samples will be collected weekly for a minimum of 30 days after the last active case of influenza is depopulated, processed, or no longer shedding virus.

(c) Non-commercial poultry operations

- (i) An inventory of at-risk non-commercial operations will be developed by UDAF and USDA/APHIS/VS of the affected zone. At-risk operations are defined as those with poultry, waterfowl, pigeons, or ratites.
- (ii) All at-risk non-commercial operations will have swab samples collected for RT-PCR testing and/or virus isolation. Both cloacal and tracheal samples will be collected from gallinaceous birds and ratites; only cloacal samples will be collected from waterfowl.
- (iii) The total number of birds that will be sampled in each unit is presented in Table 1. Serologic surveillance shall continue weekly for a minimum of 30

days after the last active case of influenza is depopulated, processed, or no longer shedding virus.

(iv) Swab samples for RT-PCR testing and/or virus isolation shall be collected weekly for a minimum of 30 days after the last active case of influenza is depopulated, processed, or no longer shedding virus.

(4) Surveillance Zone

(a) The surveillance zone includes the area between 5 and 10 miles (8 and 16 km) of the index flock. The target population to include in surveillance includes all commercial and non-commercial poultry operations. Surveillance is also to include, when considered appropriate, any commercial or non-commercial flocks with epidemiologic links to the index flock that might be located outside of the official surveillance and quarantine zones. Surveillance efforts in this zone will be conducted simultaneously with those in the affected zone.

(b) Commercial poultry operations

- (i) Testing procedures for commercial poultry operations in the surveillance zone will be identical to those applied in the affected zone.
- (ii) Cloacal and tracheal swabs samples for RT-PCR testing and/or virus isolation will be collected from all commercial operations at the initiation of this surveillance plan and again 21 days following initial sampling. The total number of birds to be sampled on each operation is presented in Table 1.

(c) Non-commercial poultry operations

- (i) Testing procedures for non-commercial poultry operations in the surveillance zone will be identical to those applied in the affected zone.
- (ii) Cloacal and tracheal swabs samples for RT-PCR testing and/or virus isolation will be collected from each non-commercial operation at the initiation of this surveillance plan and again 21 days following initial sampling. The total number of birds to be sampled on each operation is presented in Table 1.

(5) Buffer Zone

- (a) The buffer zone includes the area between 10 and 30 miles (16 and 50 km) from the index flock. Surveillance is also to include, when considered appropriate, any commercial or non-commercial flocks with epidemiologic links to the index flock that might be located outside of the official buffer, surveillance, and affected zones.
- (b) An inventory of commercial and non-commercial poultry operations will be developed by UDAF and USDA/APHIS/VS in conjunction with the Advisory Committee. All at-risk non-commercial poultry operations within 0.3 miles (0.5 km) of commercial poultry operations will be identified, and tracheal or cloacal swab samples collected once for RT-PCR. The total number of birds to be sampled on each operation is presented in Table 1.
- (c) Commercial poultry operations will comply with all other requirements as contained in the existing MOU.

(B) Movement and biosecurity

- (a) Movement controls will be implemented relating to live birds, dead birds, eggs, egg flats, litter, trucks, equipment, workers, etc., within the affected zone. These orders will remain in place until surveillance is completed.
 - (b) No avian species may be moved out of or into the quarantined area.
- (c) No poultry products or supplies, excluding properly washed and sanitized and/or monitored for AI: table eggs, egg products, or processed poultry products in properly sanitized containers and vehicles, may be moved off the affected premises or out of the quarantine area. Eggs going to breaker must be transported in disposable non-returnable flats.
- (d) Trucks or vehicles entering the affected premises must be thoroughly disinfected prior to entering and leaving the affected premises.
- (e) If testing within the affected, surveillance, or buffer zone detects any additional positive flocks or farms, the quarantine zone will be extended accordingly.
- (f) Only permitted movements will be allowed until surveillance is completed within all three zones.
- (g) Industry and regulatory officials may discuss specific details in the event of an outbreak.

(C) Depopulation and disposal

- (a) Small populations will be euthanized humanely and disposed by incineration or burial on premise or in an appropriate landfill. Experience dictates that large numbers of birds can overwhelm incinerators and private arrangements for burial or composting. Larger populations will be disposed by burial at an acceptable landfill with attention to transportation routes and disinfection of transport vehicles.
- (b) If depopulation is chosen as the preferred method of dealing with an H/LPAI outbreak, the following methods may be used for disposal of the birds.
- (i) In-house or approved on site composting may be used for disposal of birds and is the desired method when practical. (Appendix #3)
- (ii) Birds that are not able to be composted may be disposed of in an approved landfill in compliance with Department of Environmental Quality requirements. Vehicles transporting carcasses to the landfill (and upon returning) must be covered and sealed to prevent escape of liquid and airborne material, such as blood, feathers, and dander. (See Appendix # 4 for landfill locations, capacity, and availability.)
- (iii) Smaller flocks may be incinerated using the UDAF T400 Airburner, in compliance with Department of Environmental Quality requirements, if conditions permit.

(D) Euthanasia

- (a) Only American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) approved methods of euthanasia shall be employed.
- (b) CO₂ gas injected into containers will be the primary, but not necessarily the only, method of euthanasia.

(E) Premises decontamination and disinfection

- (a) Manure and all organic material shall be completely removed from infected buildings. If taken to an approved off-site location, it must be transported in a covered and leak-proof container.
- (b) The sides of the building shall be scraped to remove all residual organic material that might harbor virus.
- (c) Manure shall be buried or composted on the premises or double bagged and taken to a designated landfill or incinerator according to an approved transportation plan, and taken to an approved off-site location in a covered and leak-proof container.
- (d) After cleaning, the physical facility and equipment shall be appropriately cleaned and disinfected with Virkon $S^{\text{®}}$ or other approved disinfectants.
 - (e) Rodent and fly control measures will be intensified if necessary.
- (f) Poultry repopulation of the infected premises shall not occur until the disease is deemed to be eradicated by state and federal animal health officials plus two weeks. Sentinel birds may be required prior to repopulation.

(F) Biosecurity practices

- (1) Ongoing biosecurity practices are to be followed before and after outbreaks according to Appendix #5 and the MOU. Additional guidelines are found at the following web sites:
- (c) Commercial turkeys *Biosecurity Principles: Protecting the Utah Turkey Industry*, USU Extension Fact Sheet AG/Poultry Health/Biosecurity/03, http://extension.usu.edu/files/publications/Biosecurity/03.pdf
- (d) Exhibition poultry producers and exhibitors *Biosecurity Principles: Protecting Your Investment*, USU Extension Fact Sheet AG/Poultry/Health/Biosecurity/01 http://extension.usu.edu/files/agpubs/poulprinciples.pdf

VI. PUBLIC RELATIONS RESPONSE/COMMUNICATION

- UDAF and USDA/APHIS/VS will strive to inform the partners of the situation via a contact list including the AI Advisory Committee, Accredited Veterinarians, appropriate industry members, and all signatory parties of an MOU regarding this plan.
- (A) All inquiries by public media about serologic findings, outbreaks, or other questions dealing with actual or suspected cases of AI infection in Utah are to be directed to the State Veterinarian's office.
- (B) Information released to the public should be timely and include the following general information:
 - 1. Nature and extent of the emergency.
 - 2. Impacted or potentially affected areas of the state.
 - 3. Human health implications or lack thereof.
- 4. Activities being carried out by government officials and industry leaders to respond to the outbreak or mitigate its effects.

497 498 499	(C) The use of radio and television may include prepared announcements, interviews, question and answer sessions, live footage, and so forth depending on the circumstances.		
500 501 502 503	(D) Information released may also include newspaper inserts or supplements which provide detailed information the public could use, and information about the steps being taken by the state and industry to protect them.		
504	Appendix #1		
505 506 507 508	Avian influenza surveillance under the NPIP is conducted at different levels. The NPIP awards an "Avian Influenza Clean" status to flocks that satisfy the requirements for avian influenza.		
509	NPIP Requirements for "Avian Influenza Clean" status		
510	U.S. Avian Influenza Clean Egg-and Meat-Type chicken —Primary. A minimum of 30 birds would have to have been tested negative for antibodies to avian influenza when the flock is more than 4 months of age to qualify. After qualification, a sample of at least 30 birds from the flock would have to be tested negative at intervals of 90 days to retain the classification. U.S. Avian Influenza Clean Egg-and Meat-Type chicken —Multiplier. A minimum of 30 birds would have to have been tested negative for antibodies to avian influenza when the flock is more than 4 months of age to qualify. After qualification, a sample of at least 30 birds from the flock would have to be tested negative at intervals of 180 days to retain the classification.		
511 512 513 514 515 516	Additionally, NPIP also grants an H5/H7 Avian Influenza Clean classification for turkey breeding flocks.		
517	Appendix #3		
518 519 520 521	PROCEDURE FOR IN-HOUSE COMPOSTING		
522 523 524	DEAD OR EUTHANIZED BIRDS infected with AIV may be composted in the following manner:		
525 526 527	1. Twelve inches of litter, straw, shavings or other organic material should be used as a base. An eight to ten inch layer of bird carcasses is piled on top of this and sprayed with enough water to saturate the feathers. Six inches of organic		

528	material is placed on top of this. Successive layers may be piled on each other to
529	the height of six feet. The width of the windrow should be approximately twelve
530	feet.
531	
532	2. The house is heated to 100° F for three days.
533	2. The house is heated to 100 1 for three days.
534	3. Windrow temperatures are monitored and should reach 135° to 145° F within
535	one week.
536	
537	4. The windrow is turned at two weeks and the house is heated again for three
538	days.
539	
540	5. Windrow temperatures continue to be monitored.
541	
542	6. Compost may be removed after one month.
543	
544	
545	
546	Appendix #4
547	**
548	LANDFILL LOCATIONS AND AVAILABILITY IN THE STATE OF UTAH

County Landfill name address Potential capacity (tons/day) Phone person Phone person

552		Appendix #5
553		
554	GENER	RAL BIOSECURITY MEASURES TO PREVENT TRANSMISSION OF
555		AVIAN INFLUENZA
556	TGOT 4 777	
557		ON refers to the confinement of animals within a controlled environment.
558	-	be mechanically transmitted by anything that can walk, crawl, or fly from farm
559	to farm.	
560 561	1.	Clean out vegetation around poultry houses to remove shelter and food for possible carriers.
562	2.	Institute a vector control program for insect, mammal and avian vectors.
563		These vectors are important because they can mechanically carry infected
564		feces from one house or premises to another.
565		a. Improve barriers to prevent the access of wild birds to poultry houses.
566 567		b. Institute an insect control program. Flies of several species are important in the transfer of AIV.
568		c. Rodents have implicated in the transfer of AIV. Rodent control and
569		preventing their traffic between houses on a single premises are
570		essential.
571	3.	Prevent the accumulation of standing water. This is a great attraction to
572		migrating waterfowl and shorebirds, both of which have been implicated in Al
573		outbreaks/transmission.
574	4.	Limit sources of food for wild and free-flying birds. Clean up spills when
575		they happen.
576	5.	Do not allow employees to raise their own poultry or attend poultry markets
577		or shows.
578	6.	Freshly laundered clothes for employees should be changed into at the farm.
579		These clothes should be left at the farm at the end of the day.
580	7.	Employees should shower out at the end of the day.
581	8.	The interior of cars/vehicles should be sprayed for flies prior to leaving the
582		premises.
583	9.	Manure and dead birds may not move from the premises unless appropriate
584		biosecurity principles are adhered to.
585		
586	The sprea	nd of avian influenza follows the movement of people and equipment.
587	1.	Do not allow movement of people, your employees or other individuals, from
588		your farm to other farms.
589	2.	Conduct business by telephone. Inform other farms of the need for
590		heightened biosecurity.
591	3.	Do not let truck drivers, repairmen, or delivery personnel step out onto your
592		facility without new protective foot covering and coveralls.
593	4.	Use gates and signs to control traffic
594	5.	Wash and disinfect all vehicles prior to them leaving the farm.
595	6.	Avoid movement of equipment off of the farm. Wash and disinfect prior to
596		equipment leaving the farm.